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The quality - not the size  - of the state is what counts. And a
prerequisite for changing the role of the state is an improved
political process. Without that, any new development strategy
will fail.
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Most countries struggling to achieve economic  *  Privatize wisely and effectively.
growth and broader development objectives in
the last 10 years have changed their strategies to  *  Conduct an effective dialogue with the
incorporate two basic thrusts: a consistent  private sector.
macroeconomic and sectoral policy framework
and a diminished role for the public sector, with  *  Operate the remaining public enterprises
more reliance on thc private sector.  more effectively.
Israel emphasizes four points in this paper:  To do each of these things, govemment will
need fewer mid-level employees and more high-
First, the argument that the size of the public  level professionals.
sector must be drastically reduced has probably
been taken too far, with no real analysis of the  Third, the number of activities the public
full consequences of the shift.  Often the disman-  ,  sector can safely and effectively undertake is
tling of some functions implies the establishment  limited. To force additional functions on the
of others.  (Thc existence of a competitive  public sector increases exponentially the chances
market is more important than private owner-  of failure and poor performance.
ship.)
Fourth, a prerequisite for changing develop-
Second, a prerequisite for successful devel-  ment strategy is a mire effective political
opment of the private sector is a modernized,  process. Seldom mentioned, this point is crucial
highly efficient public sector - particularly in  - otherwise the new development strategy will
key areas of policy management and regulation.  fail. Ingredients of a more effective political
The quality of the state is at issue, not its size.  process include a long-term perspective in policy
That quality depends on the state's being able to  design; a minimum level of stability in policy; a
do at least five things in economic management:  low level of corruption; and a general sense that
political control does not necessarily imply
*  Design, monitor, and implement consis  public ownership or operation. These points are
tent macroeconomic and sectoral poli-  widely accepted in principle but not in practice,
cies.  says Israel.
*  Provide an enabling environment for
competition, private or public.
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I.  Introduction
A crucial development in the last decade has been the change in the
strategy being pursued by most countries for achieving economic growth and
broader developmental objectives.  The essential elements of this strategy
are, first, the preponderance given to a consistent policy framework both at
the macro and sectoral level and, second, a changed (usually diminished) role
for the public sector and a greater reliance on the private sector.
The universality of acceptance of the need to change the role of the
state is remarkable.  It is  being pursued, in different degrees, by most
countries irrespective of ideology,  political structures or levels of
development.  Nor does it seem to be related to secular trends regarding the
size of the public sector at different stages of development.  A worldwide
consensus has emerged about the limits of what can  be achieved by public
sectors, the failure of centralized planning, the need to relieve the public
sector of a number of functions for which it  has proved to  be particularly
unsuitable, and about the need to look for other alternatives in the private
sector or among nongovernmental organizations to pursue a number of
development objectives.  In fact, this consensus is now sufficiently strong
that at times it has been able to overcome strong resistance from powerful
political and economic interests.
1  The author thanks his colleagues  Brian Levy, John Nellis, and Mary
Shirley for their excellent comments and contributions to this paper.- 2  -
Much  has  been  written  about  the  reasons  for  this  changing  strategy.2
First,  there  are technical  reasons. The  increasing  complexity  and
international  integration  of economies--at  all  levels  of development--has  made
it practically  impossible  to operate  in  alx  overly  centralized  manner,  either
in terms  of  planning  or of public  sector  ownership. Second,  public  sectors,
particularly  in developing  countries,  just  have  not  had the  managerial  and
administrative  capabilities  for  carrying  out  all  the  functions  expected  from
an interventionist  state,  continue  to  be  heavily  involved  in  the  production  of
a  large  number  of goods  and  services  and  in  addition,  for  trying  to fine  tune
the  economy  by conscious  "positive  distortions"  aimed  at correcting  market
failures,  providing  incentives  to certain  activities  or regions,  discouraging
others,  and  achieving  a large  number  of other  specific  social  or  political
purposes. Third,  the  many  functions,  operations,  and  corrections  which  the
state  undertakes  give  openings  for  all  types  of political  interventions,  often
resulting  in  consequences  diametrically  different  from  those  originally
intended  by the  politicians.  This is  often  due  to the  confusion  in  which  the
activities  of the  public  sector  are  often  undertaken  and  to the  inefficiency
of the  political  process  itself. Not  to  mention,  of course,  the  many
opportunities  for  private  "rent  seeking"  emanating  f:om  such  situations.
For  all the  consensus  of the  need to  change,  there  continues  to  be
substantial  controversy  as to the  appropriate  role  of a reformed  state. At
2  See,  for  example,  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1988. Oxford
University  Press.-3-
one  end  of the  spectrum  are  proponents  of an  entirely  laissez  faire  state;  at
the  other  end  are those  who  maintain  that  the  state  has an active  promotional
role  even  in  private-led  development  strategies.  This  paper  will  not take
sides  in the  debate  over  laissez-faire  versus  promotion. Rather,  its  starting
point  is that  a fast  dismantling  of the  state  is inadequate  as a policy
prescription,  even for  laissez-faire  strategies,  and  very little  serious
thinking  has taken  place  regarding  the  "specific"  implications  for  the  public
sector  of the  new  development  strategies.  The  purpose  of this  paper  is to
briefly  begin  to develop  the  following  points:
1.  The  argument  that  the  size  of the  public  sector  needs  to  be
drastically  reduced  has probably  been  taken  too  far,  without  really  analyzing
the  full  consequences  of the  shift. Often  the  dismantling  of some  functions
implies  the  establishment  of others.
2.  A crucial  prerequisite  for  the  successful  development  of the  private
sector  is the  existence  of a  modernized  and  highly  efficient  public  sector,
particularly  in  a number  of  key  areas  of policy  management  and  regulation.
The issue  is the  quality.  not the  size  of the  state.
3.  At the  same  time,  the  number  of activities  that  the  public  sector
can  safely  and  effectively  undertake  is  quite  limited. 3 To force  additional
3  For  empirical  evidence  on the  adverse  effects  of large  governments,
see  Bela  Balassa,  "Public  Finance  and  Economic  Development".  World  Bank,  PPR,
Working  Paper  No. 31.-4-
functions  on the  public  sector  increases  exponentially  the  chances  of failure
and  poor  performance.
4.  The  change  in  development  strategy  also  requires  as a  prerequisite  a
modernization  and  an improved  performance  of the  political  process. This
point  is seldom  mentioned  but it is  crucial;  otherwise,  the  new  development
strategy  will fail.
The  analysis  has  the  Latin  American  reality  as  background,  but is
based  on the  broader  experience  of the  World  Bank  in this  area. The tone  of
the  paper  is  normatiie;  its  purpose  is to  highlight  the  importance  of .he  four
points  stated  above.
II.  Has the  Pendulum  Swug  Too  Far?
Much  has  been  written  and  discussed  about  the  role  of the  state  from
philosophical,  political  and  economic  points  of  views.  Interesting  arguments
have  been  developed  to  help  define  the  functions  that  shou'ld  belong  to the
public  and  to the  private  sectors. However,  we are  not  interested  in  those
debates  in this  paper. Our  purpose  is to explore  what a  more  private  sector-
oriented  strategy  means  in  terms  of the  sRecific  roles  that  should  be played
by the  public  sector. For  these  purposes,  it  is sufficient  to accept  the
conventional  wisdom  regarding  the  role  of the  state. This  is summarized  in
the  World  Bank's  World  Development  Report  (WDR)  of 1988. The  report  states
that  a pragmatic  approach,  balancing  the  arguments  of both  the  public  interestand  private  interest  views  and  concentrating  on the  benefits  and  costs  of
government  intervention,  is  the  most  useful  way  of looking  at this  issue.4 Of
course,  the  results  will  vary considerably  from  country  to  country,  depending
on their  political  and  institutional  capabilities  to  manage  those
interventions.  The  WDR ranks  areas  of  economic  activity  according  to the
level  of  desirability  of government  interventions,  based  on criteria  such  as
the  promotion  of economic  efficiency  and  growth,  poverty  alleviation  and
stabilization.  The  report's  proposed  ranking  lists  as first  priority  public
goods  such  as "defense,  diplomacy,  macroeconomic  management,  and  a legal  and
institutional  system  that  defines  and  enforces  the  rules  of justice,  property
and  commerce"  (WDR  88,  p. 52). It ranks  second  priority  the  need for
governments  to  help in the  provision  of  what it calls  the  secial,  physical  and
information  infrastructure,  including  activities  such  education,  health,
transport  networks,  public  utilities,  X  hnology  development  and  dissemination
and  environmental  protection.
Beyond  these  areas  where  market  imperfections  make it difficult  for
the  private  sector  to  produce  the  needed  goods  and  services,  the  report
postulates  that  the  costs  of government  intervention  outweigh  the  potential
benefits  in  most  of the  productive  activities  in  agriculture,  industry,
4  The  WDR  88 summarizes  the  position  of the  public  and  private  interest
groups  as follows: "The  public  interest  view stresses  the  potential  benefits
of government  intervention  when it is  effectively  deployed  to correct  market
failures. It also  provides  a framework  for  identifying  the  conditions  under
which  market  failure  is likely  to occur  and for  designing  the  appropriate
policies  to  offset  these  failures. The  private  interest  view  emphasizes  the
potential  for  failure  and  cautions  against  an  overly  sanguine  view  of
government  as the  impartial  guardian  of the  public  interest."  World  Bank,
World  Development  Report  1988,  page  51.- 6 -
energy,  mining,  and  most  of the  services,  particularly  the  financial  service.
It  should  be noted,  however,  that  the  second  category  of areas  in
which  government  intervention  is  justified  leaves  the  subject  wide  open. A
number  of  practical  experiments  and  research  are  presently  focussed  on the
exploration  of the  private  provision  of such  types  of services.5  Another
perhaps  more  practical  way  of looking  at this  issue  is  to consider  as a direct
government  responsibility  the  need  to  ensure  the  provision  of the  goods  and
services  in  that  second  category,  whether  through  regulation  of the  private  or
by  direct  intervention  of the  public  sector.
However,  this  scheme,  now  widely  accepted,  is  biased  towards  private
sector  solutions. First,  experience  suggests  that  the  issue  of ownership,
although  important  and  a major  determinant  of  economic  performance,  might  not
always  be the  most important.  Often,  the  main issue  is  the  existence  of a
competitive  market  rather  than  private  ownership. In  theory,  if there  is  a
competitive  market,  a public  sector  agency  operating  in  that  market  that  is
actually  allowed  fully  to  behave  as a  competitive  unit,  is  likely  to  have  a
level  of operational  performance  similar  to  a private  sector  unit  operating  in
that  same  market. The  issue  of course,  is  whether  governments  can  muster  the
political  will to  give  that  level  of freedom. Remarkably,  there  are  not  many
technical  studies  that  directly  compare  performance  of the  same  activities
operating  in  the  private  and  public  sectors  and  most  of those  available  are
5  See,  for  example,  Gabriel  Roth,  The  Private  Provision  of Public
Services  in  Developing  Countries. Oxford  University  Press,  1987.- 7 -
very partial. One  study  concludes  that:  "There  is  no evidence  of a
statistically  satisfactory  kind  to suggest  that  public  enterprises  in  LDCs
have a lower  level  of technical  efiiciency  than  private  firms  operatirng  at the
same  scale  of operation. (But)  on  a less  formal  level  the  tendency...  seems
to  be pointing  in that  direction.'; 6 Other  more  partial  studies,  of industrial
and  manufacturing  public  enterprises  and  private  operators  in  jute  and  textile
in  Bangladesh  also  found  no clear  evidence  of private  sector  superiority. 7
The studies  made in  developed  countries  about  the  relative  performance  of
public  and  private  electric  power  companies  are  inconclusive  in this  respect.
Also,  although  no conclusive  studies  have  been  made,  it  seems  that  at least  in
developed  countries,  the  operational  performance  of  a number  of competitive
state-owned  industrial  enterprises--for  example,  in  Western  European
countries--is  not  noticeably  different  from  similar  enterprises  in the  private
sector.
One  can  still  postulate  that  ownership  matters  and  that  private
sector  units  will  be more  efficient. It is likely,  but the  differe,nce  in  some
cases  might  not  be tlhs.  significant.  More importantly,  it  might  not  be
6  For  surveys  of the  literature  comparing  the  performance  of  public  and
private  enterprises  in  the  same  industries,  see  R. Milward,  "Measured  Sources
of Inefficiency  in the  Performance  of Public  and  Private  Enterprises  in  LDCs",
in  Paul  Cook  and  Colin  Kirkpatrick  (eds.) Privatization  in  Less  Developed
Countries. New  York:  St.  Martins  Press,  and  S.  Domberger  and  J. Piggott,
"Privatization  Policies  and  Public  Enterprises:  A Survey",  Economic  Record,
62,  1986. Also Bela  Balassa,  "Public  Enterprises  in  Developing  Countries:
Issues  of Privatization'  in Public  Finance  and  Performance  of  Enterprises,
Detroit,  Michigan: Wayne  University  Press,  1989.
7  John  Nellis  and  Sunita  Kikeri: "Public  Enterprise  Reform:
Privatization  and  the  World  Bank". World  DeveloRment,  Vol. 17,  No. 5,  1989,
Page  664.-8-
worthwhile  for  governments  to  use their  scarce  political  capital  fighting to
privatize  an activity  to achieve  only  minor  gains  in efficieniy. 8 Rather,
that  capital  should  be  used to  expand  the  ambit  of competitive  markets. More
of this  below.
The second  count  has to  do  with the  intrinsic  nature  of the
activities  themselves.  Most discussions  about  the  role  of the  state  usually
take  place  in  general  terms,  without  exploring  sectoral  or subsectoral
differences.  The  argument  here is  that  the  intrinsic  nature  and  technological
basis  of  an activity  is a central  determinant  of  performance.  Many units  in
the  "hard"  sectors  and  subsectors,  such  as industry,  telecommunications,
electric  power,  have  been able  to  maintain  in  the  public  sector  a minimrm
le,,-el  of  operational  effectiveness,  even  under  extremely  unfavorable  general
economic  conditions.  This  has  been so  largely  because  the  hard technologies
impose  an operational  discipline  that  "soft"  activities  such  as education,  the
provision  of many services  in  agriculture  and  health,  most of the  activities
in rural  areas,  especially  at lower  levels  of development,  and  most  of the
activities  of the  central  government  do  not  have. What the  "hard"  activities
have is specificity,  the  possibility  of defining  objectives  and  outcomes,  and
of tracing  those  outcomes  or  the  short  run.
8  One  could  ask  a follow-up  question: what  purpose  does it  serve  to
have such  a productive  unit in the  public  sector,  except  as a source  of
political  power. By definition,  more  of the  government's  political  and  social
objectives  could  not  be imposed  on such  a unit;  otherwise  they  cannot  operate
as competitive  units.-9-
The  experience  of developing  countries  contains  many  examples  of
this  phenomenon. Even  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  where  the  performance  of the
public  sector  is  especially  poor,  there  are  a number  of  examp-as  of "nard"
public  sector  agencies  or enterprises  that  have  managed  to  survive,  and  even
to thrive. Examplos  such  as the  Ethiopian  Airlines,  the  power  companies  in
Tanzania  and  Ghana  and,  until  recently,  the  Kenya  Tea  Development  Authority
have  been cited  in this  respect. Studies  of these  cases  note that  these  units
were  able  to attract  relatively  high  caliber  staff  which  helped  to  generate  a
political  power  base of its  own,  thus  allowing  these  agencies  to  be relatively
immune  from  excessive  politica_  intervention,  especially  as regards  staffing,
and  ensured  a minimum  level  of financial  support. 9 A number  of other  similar
examples  can  be quoted  for  Latin  America  and  Africa,  at least  until  the  acute
economic  crisis  resulted  in  a financial  deterioration  of these  units,  followed
by an inevitable  technical  deterioration.
Conversely,  there  are "soft"  activities,  principally  in the  so-
called  social  sectors,  for  which  there  is  little  discipline  imposed  by the
underlying  technology  and intrinsic  characteristics  of the  activity;  they  are
not "specific"  enough. If,  in  addition,  these  acti%rtties  or sectors  operate
under  monopolistic  conditions,  without  profiting  from  the  discipline  imposed
by competitive  markets,  and  without  their  own  source  of income,  their  chance
of operating  effectively  in  the  public  sector  are  very  slim  indeed. Here
ownership  (or,  more  precisely  in this  area,  the  possibility  of failure  ard
9  See  A. Israel,  Instltutional  Development:  Incentives  to  Performance.
Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  Baltimore,  1987.- 10  -
closure  according  to  market  rules)  and  exposing  the  activity  to  a competitive
environment  are  crucial  for  achieving  a higher  level  of operational
performance. Classical  cases  in  this  respect  are  agricultural  marketing
boards,  perennial  losers  in the  hands  of the  public  sector,  education  and
health  services,  and  other  services  in  agriculture,  such  as input  supply. It
is in thes3  activities  that  the  largest  gains  from  a  more  reduced  role  by the
public  sector  can  be achieved.
However,  we should  keep in  mind that  this  agreement  does  not  mean
that "hard"  p"blic  sector  agencies  or enterprises  are  performing  well,
especially  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa;  it  only  means  that  they  are  performing  less
badly  than those  in  the  "soft"  activities.
Here  we conclude  with  a paradox. If the  two  points  raised  above  are
right,  then  the  relativ_  gains  of  private  sector  operation  are  potentially
higher  in  the  second  of the  categories  in WDR  88,  that  which  contains  the
"merit"  goods  in  which  the  role  of the  public  secto.  is  considered  essential.
Conversely,  if  a government  brings  itself  to  provide  clear  and  depoliticized
rules  of the  game  for  the  state-owned  enterprises  in the  hard  sectors  and  to
expand  the  ambit  of competitive  markets,  then  the  urge  and  the  benefits  of
privatizing  those  activities  might  be considerably  reduced. 10 In short,  the
discussions  on the  role  of the  state  should  be disaggregated  by sector  or
10 The  last  section  of this  paper  deals  with  the  political  dimension,
but  an obvious  counter-argument  here  is that  public  enterprises  fail  not
because  they  are incapable  theoretically  of achieving  efficiency,  but rather
because  politicians  are  incapable  of resisting  interference,  no matter  how
many safeguards  are  built  into  a system.- 11  -
subsector,  but the  real  potential  for  substantial  improvements  in  efficiency
in relative  terms  might  be found  in  the  private  provision  of  public  services
in the  social  or "merit"  sectors. Of course,  large  gains  in  efficiency  in
absolute  terms  might  still  be obtained  by the  privatization  of "hard"
activities  in industry,  energy  and  transport.
The third  caveat,  and  perhaps  the  most  important,  is  that  a central
ingredient  of a  development  strategy  based  on a larger  role  for  the  ?rivate
sector  is a greatly  modernized  and  higher  quality  public  sector. This  point
has  been  made  before. What  has  not  been  made is  a systematic  exploration  of
what it  means. The  section  that  follows  contains  an attempt  in  this  respect.
III.  The  Ouality  of the  State
What  kind  of reorientation  is required  in the  public  sector  to adapt
it to the  new  development  strategies  being  pursued  by most  Latin  American
countries? Although  such  reorientation  would  be needed  throughout  the  public
sector,  including  its  core  or traditional  activities  (e.g.,  defense,  police,
diplomacy,  infrastructure)  the  focus  of this  discussion  is those  changes  that
are  required  to  promote  economic  and  social  development.  This  reorientation
requires  changes  in a) the  functions  performed  by the  public  sector;  b) the
administrative  structures;  c) the  procedures  followed,  and  d) the  skills  and
management  systems  required.- 12 -
Functions
The  reorientation  of the  public  sector  with  the  new  development
strategies  comprises  a number  of  different  functions  that  we cannot  pretend  to
detail  in  this  paper,  but  we wish to  highlight  the  following  five.
1.  The  capacity  to  design.  monitor  and implement  a consistent  set  of
macroeconomic  and  sectoral  policies. A central  ingredient  of the  new
development  strategies  is  a consistent  set  of  macroeconomic  and  sectoral
policies. Unfortunately,  there  is  still  no technique  for  estimating  the
economic  and  social  returns  of good  policies,  but it is  a reasonable
hypothesis  that  the  return  to  good  and  consistent  policies  is the  highest
possible--Latin  America's  experience  is  littered  with  cases  of bad  and
meandering  policies,  with  glaring  costs. A corollary  is  that  the  financial
and institutional  resources  devoted  to  ensuring  a  high quality  of  policy
management  are  probably  those  yielding  the  highest  returns. It is  difficult
to think  of a more  productive  use  of resources.
While  high  quality  policy  management  has  a central  political  content
(more  on this in  the  next  section)  it  also  has  heavy  institutional  and
technical  components.  A preliminary  analysis  of the  successful  cases  of
policy  formulation  and implementation  (France,  UK,  Korea,  Chile,  Mauritius,
India,  Botswana,  etc.)  suggests  that  there  was in the  key  agencies  (e.g.,  the
ministry  of finance,  the  central  bank,  the  trade  agencies,  the  main  sectoral
ministries)  a  number  of  highly  qualified  staff  capable  of analyzing  policy- 13 -
options,  of  making  decisions  in a  coordinated  way among  agencies,  and  of
maintaining  a reasonably  effective  communication  with the  political
establishment,  often  being  able  to  modify  decisions  on  policy  directions  taken
at the  political  level. Interestingly,  the  actual  organizational  structure  of
this  group  of agencies  is  not a  major  contributing  factor  to success. More
important  is the  communication  among  the  policy  analysts  and  decision  makers.
This  capacity,  which  we  may call  the  brain  or  nerve  center  of the
government,  need  not  be too  large. It  will  vary from  country  to  country,  but
we are  probably  talking  of 30 to 200  persons,  perhaps  even  less  in  some  small
countries. One  thing  is  clear:  if  this  capacity  is  not in  place,  basically
nothing  else  works  well.  And the  analogy  with the  brain  is  particularly
relevant  for  a development  strategy  more  reliant  on  market  forces,  which  is
meant  to  be more flexible  and  adaptable  to changing  circumstances.  But  this
need  for  flexibility  applies  not  only  to the  private  sector;  the  same
flexibility  is  required  from  the  public  sector,  to adapt  policies  and  policy
management  to those  changing  circumstances.
Thus,  we wish to  postulate  that  to  have  this  central  capacity  for
policy  analysis  and  management  at the  macro  and  sectoral  levels  is the  first
priority  in  the  reorientation  of the  role  of the  state,  and  governments  should
be willing  to  pay  a  very  high  price  to  have it.  In Latin  America,  practically
all  countries  do have  the  technical  and  managerial  pool  from  which  such  a
capacity  could  be drawn. None  is in  the  dire  situation  of a  number  of
countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  which  do not  actually  have the  necessary- 14 -
skills  in  the  country. What  often  happens  in  Latin  America  is that  those
technical  and  managerial  resources  are  not in  the  right  place  or,  if they  are,
they  might  be hardly  used  or not  used  at all. Mechanisms  have to  be devised
to  attract  and  retain  these  skills  to the  right  places,  preferably  within  the
rules  under  which  the  civil  service  operates. But  if that  is  not  possible,
this  might  be the  one  case in  which  an  exception  ought  to  be made and  it
should  be the  duty  of the  political  establishment  to  convince  public  opinion
that  it is  necessary. What  kind  of exception  depends  on each  country,  but it
usually  implies  a combination  of pay,  benefits  and  status  that  will  put  staff
at a different  level  from  the  rest  of the  public  administration.  This  has a
heavy  cost,  but  we postulate  that  the  alternatives  are  even  more  costly.
Also,  some  countries  have  been  pursuing  more  extreme,  or imaginative  (or  very
old) solutions.  Ghana  has  privatized  part  of the  tax  collection  services  and
Indonesia  has  privatized  the  custom  services. Other  countries  have  relied
heavily  on consultants.
In a democratic  system,  this  capacity  for  policy  analysis  and  design
need  not  be all  in the  public  sector. In  fact,  it is  healthy  that  part  of
that  capacity  is outside  the  government,  in  politically  independent
universities  or think  tanks.
In retrospect,  it  is remarkable  that  there  is  still  not  a full
awareness  of the  crucial  importance  of this  issue,  even  in a  number  of
developed  countries. But  then,  perhaps  it  is  not  surprising.  The  effects  of
good  or  bad  policies  are  pervasive  and it  would  be hard  to trace  them  to  an- 15 -
origin  in  policy  analysis  and  design. But  the  magnitude  and  effects  of the
mistakes  are there  for  everybody  to  see;  what  has  to  be impressed  upon  the
political  establishment  is  that  those  effects  are  the  result  of the  work  of a
very small  number  of key  people. Also,  we should  not  forget  that  sometimes
politicians  might  not  be interested  in  having  technical  advice  or they  might,
just  ignore  it.  The impact  of technocrats  will grow  only  slowly,  hopefully
through  an increasingly  close  interaction  with  the  political  establishment.
In short,  good  advice  is  necessary,  but it  may  not  be sufficient,  for  good
policy.
2.  The  caRacity  to  -provide  a  conducive  enabling  environment  for  the
Drivate  and  public  sector  activities  that  will  oRerate  in  comRetitive
environments.  The  provision  of  an enabling  environment  is  a general  label
that  comprises  at least  three  main  categories.  The first  is  the  dismantling
of  what  we may call  the  disabling  environment.  At the  policy  level,  this
means  the  enactment  of the  liberalizing  policies  propounded  in  recent  years,
the  privatization  and  liquidation  of public  sector  activities  which  compete
unfairly  with  private  sector  ones  or  are  simply  non-performing,  and  the
elimination  of restrictions  on competition.  However,  policy  changes  are  a
necessary  but  not sufficient  condition  for  success. Also required  are  legal
changes  and,  perhaps  more importantly,  modifications  in  the  functions  of the
state;  i.e.,  many  controlling  and  licensing  functions  have  to  be eliminated,
for  example,  in foreign  trade  and  foreign  exchange  controls,  industrial  and
transport  licensing,  financial  controls,  etc.- 16 -
Behind  these  functions  there  are  public  sector  agencies  performing
them  which  have to  be dismantled  or  reoriented. In  practice,  this  has  not
been easy.  In some  countries,  entrenched  bureaucracies  with considerable
political  power  have.managed  to  neutralize  or greatly  reduce  the  impact  of
policy  reforms. The forces  against  change,  including  very  specific  financial
benefits  to some  of the  actors,  have  acted  against  the  adoption  or
implementation  of, for  example,  reforms  to liberalize  quantitative
restrictions  in  countries  as diverse  as  Kenya,  the  Philippines  under  Ferdinand
Marcos,  and  Guinea. In  other  cases,  powerful  central  leaders  have  managed  to
push  for  the  policy  changes  in  spite  of  bureaucratic  opposition,  and  the  old
agencies  have  been left  more  or less  intact  but  without  a function  to  perform.
Such  a  pattern  was evident  with  Mexico's  dismantling  of quantitative
restrictions  over  the  objections  of SECOFI,  its  Ministry  of Trade  and
Industry,  and  with Tunisia's  abolition  of the  requirement  that  prior  to  entry
firms  obtain  clearance  from  API,  the  Agence  des  Promotion  des  Investissements.
This is a  dangerous  situation,  aside  from  the  waste  of resources  involved,
because  those  agencies  can  rebound  or redirect  their  activities  in  unwanted
directions. In a few  cases,  agencies  have  been  quickly  dismantled  or
reoriented  to adapt  them  to the  policy  changes. The  experience  in  developing
countries  or in  Latin  America  as regards  the  evolution  of these  institutional
adaptations  has  not  yet  been  documented."'
11  For  an initial  attempt  to  analyze  these  dimensions  of  reform,  see
Brian  Levy,  "The  Impact  of Public  Institutions  on Trade  and  Investment  Policy
Reform",  PPR,  The  World  Bank,  October  1989.- 17 -
Privatization  and  liquidation  of  public  sector  activities  should
also  be considered  a  central  ingredient  in the  elimination  of the  disabling
environment. Many  of the  activities  that  should  be privatized  compete  for
resources  and  markets  with  private  sector  activities  which  could  perform  those
activities  more effectively.
The second  aspect  of the  enabling  environment  requiring  attention  is
the  provision  of a level  playing  field,  that  is,  what is  required  to  ensure  an
effective  operation  of the  private  sector  and  competitive  markets. A key
ingredient  is the  need to  have  a capacity  for  regulating non-competitive
markets  and  a  number  of  private  sector  activities.  By regulation  we mean  not
only  the  overseeing  role  required  for  the  operation  of competitive  markets
(e.g.  antitrust,  prevention  of collusion  or  monopoly)  but also  the  enforcement
of financial  and  technical  standards.  Experience  in  developed  and  developing
countries  has shown  that  this  is  an  essential  function  without  which  the  new
development  strategies  are  unlikely  to  be successful  or, in  cases  where
regulations  are  inappropriate  or nonexistent,  the  strategies  will  backfire.
Again,  paradoxically,  for  the  state  to  regulate  effectively  and
wisely  is  extremely  difficult;  in  fact,  some  people  think  that  it  might  be
even  more  difficult  and  likely  to  result  in  bigger  mistakes  than  the  state
actually  operating  the  activities  being  regulated. This,  of  course,  is  too
extreme  a  view,  but it  highlights  the  risks  of  misguided  regulation.  As it  is
discussed  below,  the  administrative  and  political  requirements  for  effective
regulation  in  terms  of quality  of the  public  sector  are  very  high  and  will- 18  -
vary  drastically  among  countries. It requires  a  high level  of skills  (for
example,  to  monitor  the  banking  system),  high ethical  standards  and  consistent
political  support,  including  a  minimum  of political  interference.  This  does
not  mean,  for  example,  that  the  government  should  own  the  banks. It  means
that  special  attention  should  be put  on the  way  they  are  regulated.
The  establishment  of  a level  playing  field  also  needs  a clear  set  of
rules  and  corresponding  institutions  that  will  permit  the  functioning  of
competitive  markets  and  the  private  sector. Again,  one  might  think  that  this
refers  to obvious  activities  that  all  public  sectors  perform  almost
automatically,  but  experience  in  Latin  America  and  many  other  developing
countries  suggests  that  that  is  not  the  case. Many  of the  relevant  functions
have to  be strengthened  and  others  have  to  be created. For  example,  the
enforcement  of standards  at the  technical  level,  often  a  key ingredient  for
promoting  exports;  the  streamlining  of  procedures  to register  property  and
protect  property  rights;  the  enforcement  of contractual  obligations  and
disclosure  laws;  effective  bankruptcy  and  foreclosure  proceedings. These,  in
a  way, are  the  minimum  requirements.  Creating  a level  playing  field  also
requires  some  form  of  regulation  of externalities  (for  example,  environmental
protection)  and  establishing  mechanisms  to assure  adequate  information,  and
equal  access  to that  infoa-mation,  on  which  to  base  market  decisions,  for
consumers,  producers,  investors  and  regulators,  through  disclosure  rules  and
other  mechanisms.- 19  -
The  absence  of such  functions  is an important  contributing  factor  to
the  flourishing  of the  underground  or informal  sector,  econoLlic  activities
that  have  no alternative  but to function  outside  the  legal  or formal  economic
system,  with  all the  disadvantages  that  implies  in terms  of growth  potential,
access  and  cost  of  credit  and  workers'  protection.  Not to  mention  the
potential  activities  that  are  simply  not started  because  of reluctance  to
operate  in  the  informal  sector. The  growth  potential  does  not  materialize,  as
has  become  evident  time  and  again  in  a number  of  countries. In  Latin  America,
the  Peruvian  experience  has  been  extensively  documented.1 2
Finally,  the  third  aspect  is  a potentially  promotional  role  on the
part  of  the  state,  following  a  policy  of creating  "positive  distortions"  to
promote  emerging  exports  or  particular  groups  of activities  in  the  domestic
economy.  ome  countries,  particularly  the  Asian  ones (Korea,  Singapore,
Taiwan)  hava  been  quite  successful  following  this  approach.  13  However,  such
an activist  policy  requires  a  delicate  role  on the  part  of the  state,  both
12  See  Hernando  de Soto,  The  Other  Path:  the  Invisible  Revolution  in
the  Third  World,  New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1989.
13  For  some  useful  contributions  towards  what is  now a  voluminous
literature,  see  Alice  Amsden,  Asia's  Next  Giant: Late  Industrialization  in
South  Korea (New  York,  1989);  Robert  Wade,  Governing  the  Market: Economic
Theory  and  the  Role  of Government  in  East  Asia Industrialization  (Princeton:
Princeton  University  Press,  (forthcoming);  Tyler  Biggs  and  Brian  Levy,
"Strategic  Interventions  and  the  political  Economy  of Industrial  Policy  in
Developing  Countries",  in  Dwight  Perkins  and  Michael  Roemer  (eds.),  Economic
Systems  Reform  in  DeveloRing  Countries  (Harvard:  1990);  and  Larry  E.  Westphal,
"Fostering  Technological  Mastery  by Means  of Selective  Infant  Industry
Protection",  in  Moshe  Syrquin  and  Simon  Teitel  (eds.)  Trade.  Stability.
Technology  and  Equity  in  Latin  America  (Academic  Press,  1982)."- 20  -
intervene  in the  economy  in  order  to  achieve  positive  distortions  requires,
first  of all,  a  political  commitment  to long  term  rather  than  short  term
objectives  and  a specialized  and  effective  institutional  capacity  to  design
and implement  the  "distortion'  policies  and  to  monitor  the  economy--including
the  political  effects--in  order  to fine  tune  or  modify  those  policies.
This  is a tall  order  for  any  country. The  potential  for  mistakes  is
huge,  and the  effects  of those  mistakes  will  also  be huge.  In  fact,  even  the
best  performers  have  made serious  mistakes  with  this  approach,  for  example,
the  support  of heavy  chemicals  and  heavy  engineering  in  Korea. Before
embarking  with such  policies,  a  country  should  make  a  hard  assessment  about
its  institutional  capacity  to implement  such  an  approach,  and  the  political
will to  push for  it.  Just  attempting  to create  a level  playing  field  might
be, in  theory,  a second  best,  but it is  hard enough  as it  is.  Yet  another
possible  paradox  in this  complex  field  is  that  countries  that  could  profit
more  from  a  proactive  development  policy  might  be the  least  likely  to  succeed
in impleme..ting  one.
3.  The  caRacity  to  privatize  wisely  and  in  an effective  way. Much  more
has  been  written  and  discussed  about  the  concept  of  piivatization  than  what it
has  been  accomplished  in financial  and  economic  terms. 14 We do  not  want to
14  See,  for  example, S.  Hanke,  "The  Privatization  Option: An Economic
Analysis",  Economic  Impact,  3,  1986;  also  G.  Yarrow,  "Does  Ownership  Matter?"
in  Cento  Veljanovski,  etc.  Privatization  and  Competition:  A Market
Prospectus,  Institute  of  Economic  Affairs,  Hobart  Paperback  28,  London,  1989.
A research  study  financed  by the  World  Bank is  underway  to  analyze  what  has
been the  ex post  impact  of privatization.- 21
add  much  to those  pages;  rather  we just  want  to emphasize  one  point: that  the
state  has  a difficult  role  to  play in  the  process  of  privatization,  if this
process  is  to  be beneficial  for  the  economy  as a  whole.
Aside  from  the  political  issues,  an important  factor  slowing  'own
the  privatization  process  in  many  Latin  American  countries  has  been the  lack
of  capacity  in the  public  sector  to  prepare  the  units  that  are Roing  to  be
privatized  so that  they  can  be sold  (or  leased,  or any  other  form  of partial
privatization).  Many  need to  be restructured  or downsized,  a  highly  technical
undertaking  for  which  few  govexrnments  hav- the  necessary  capacity  in  the  right
places. Similarly,  to  prepare  and  negotiate  a deal  is also  highly  technical
beginning,  for  example,  with issues  such  as price  and  method  of financing.
True,  such  expertise  can  be bought  from  investment  banks (at  exorbitant  cost)
but  the  public  sector  still  needs  the  capacity  to  negotiate  with the  bankers,
which  often  is  done  very  badly,  to evaluate  their  work  and  to ensure  that
their  recommendations  and  actions  are  in the  public  interest. To  have this
capacity  does  not imply  a  big organization  but  probably  only  a  unit  with  a
small  number  of  highly  qualified  professionals  with  enough  technical  and
political  independence  to do their  job  well.  The  Mexican  experience  is
interesting  in this  respect. The  extensive  privatization  process  that  has
taken  place  has  been "masterminded"  by a three-man  operation  at the  Ministry
of Finance. This  might  not  be enough  in  other  cases  with  a less  clear
political  mandate  and  does  not include  the  need  in some  cases  of restructuring
public  enterprises  to  prepare  them  for  privatization.- 22 -
Finally,  the  public  sector  needs  the  capacity  to  monitor  and  often
regulate  the  privatized  units  to  ensure  that  the  expected  efficiency  gains
from  privatization  will  materialize.  Again,  this  does  not require  a large
contingent,  but  one that  should  be of  high quality. Where  to  get  this  high
quality  staff  is  discussed  below.
4.  The  caDacity  to conduct  an effective  dialogue  with the  private
sector. An essential  ingredient  of the  new  development  strategies  is  the
existence  of  a better  and  more  comprehensive  dialogue  between  the  public  and
the  private  sectors. This  dialogue  should  be positively  oriented  towards
exchange  of information,  demands,  concerns,  interests  and  points  of view,  and
not  negatively  focussed  on coilusion  and  the  negotiation  of privileges  on
either  side.
This is essential,  but  particularly  culture-bound.  Which  form  it
should  take  will  vary from  country  to  country. What is important  is that  the
dialogue  has to  take  place  at all  levels,  from  "macro'  to "micro". In  most
Latin  American  countries,  many  of the  institutions  required  for  this  dialogue
in  both the  private  and  public  sectors  have to  be created  or reoriented.  With
few  exceptions,  most  public  sectors  do not  have  agencies  attuned  to  this  kind
of dialogue,  to look  at the  private  sector  as their  client,  with  needs  and
preferences  and  with a  voice  that  has to  be taken  into  account. To an extent,
this  is a reflection  that  the  previous  planning  and  public  sector-oriented
strategies  were almost  by definition  top  down,  with the  public  sector  agencies
seldom  oriented  towards  a dialogue  with the  public  or with  potential- 23 -
beneficiaries,  or to  "demand'  considerations.  On the  private  sector  side,
there  is  an even  wider  disparity.  At one  extreme,  the  very  small  and
powerless  private  sector  operators  including,  by definition,  the  informal
sector,  are  not grouped  in any  way  that  could  make  their  views  heard  by
government  agencies. Individually,  they  often  barely  dare  to  approach  any
public  sector  agency,  let  alone  try  to influence  them. How to  organize  a
voice  for  this  constituency  will  be a challenge  in  each  country. At the  other
extreme,  there  are  extremely  powerful  private  sector  associations  (e.g.,
Chambers  of Commerce)  grouping  the  largest  productive  units  which  maintain  a
strong  position  vis  a  vis the  public  sector  and  have often  managed  to obtain
important  privileges. So  much so that  in some  countries,  it is  thought  that
the  private  sector  is  really  quasi-public  (a  first  step  in the  privatization
process  should  be to truly  privatize  the  private  sector). In this  case,  many
of the  public  sector  agencies  dealing  with  these  groups  are  relatively  weaker
and  could  easily  yield  to  pressure. Nor  does  there  exist  much  basis  for  a
dialogue  with  regard  to the  middle  ground,  of  middle  size  private  sector  or
regional  units. These  might  be represented  in  the  large  associations  but  with
little  control  or  voice  in  them.
Important  institutional  work is  necessary  in the  private  sector  to
prepare  it for  a productive  dialogue  with the  state. Some  of those  large
organizations  need to  be reoriented  to  widen  their  representation.  New
institutions  will  have to  be established  to give  a  voice  to small  and
scattered  operators. Non-governmental  organizations  might  be quite  suitable
for  this  purpose,  at least  in the  initial  stages. But the  essential- 24 -
ingredient  for  progress  is  a substantive  political  reorientation,  from  an
excessive  pursuit  of  privileges  to a  more  open  and  constructive  dialogue  along
the  lines  indicated  above.
In the  end, the  specific  nature  of the  dialogue  between  the  public
and  private  sectors  in  a specific  country  will  be  heavily  influenced  by the
nature  of the  political  processes  in  that  country. In the  Latin  American
context,  the  usefulness  of explicit  efforts  to  promote  such  a  dialogue  remains
to  be tested. Its  effectiveness  is  heavily  determined  by deep  social
structural  forces  that  are  difficult  to change  in the  short  run.
5.  The  capacity  to operate  more  effectively  the  enterprises  that  will
remain  in the  Dublic  sector. No matter  how  drastic  the  switch  to  a  private
sector-oriented  strategy,  a good  number  of enterorises  (not  counting  the
central  government  operations)  will  remain  in the  public  sector. Their
performance  will  have to  be improved  dramatically  for  any  development  effort
to  succeed. Here,  considerable  progress  has  been  made.  In recent  years,  an
approach  has  been  developed  to  help governments  set  up clear  rules  of the  game
for  public  enterprises  in terms  of their  policy  framework,  degree  of autonomy
and  accountability.  Promising  results  have  been  obtained. If  more
governments  were to  have the  political  will to  undertake  those  reforms,  the
public  enterprise  problem  could  be substantially  reduced. 15
15  See  Mary Shirley,  The  Reform  of State-Owned  Enterprises:  Lessons
from  Work  Bank  Lending,  The  World  Bank,  June 1989.- 25 -
We think  that  this  set  of five  functions  contains  the  essential
capacities  that  need to  be created  or reinforced  in  light  of the  new
development  strategies.  The  pattern  that  emerges  from  reviewing  these
functions  is the  crucial  importance  of quality,  of  personnel  in particular,  in
the  performance  of these  functions. If anything,  the  leverage  and  impact  of
what the  government  does in  a  private  sector-oriented  strategy  might  be much
bigger: a mistake  by a  public  enterprise  in  producing  a good  or service  has a
negative  impact,  but  sometimes  a relatively  limited  one. A mistake  made  by a
regulator  could  plunge  a  whole  industry  or sector  into  a  crisis  (no  need  to go
beyond  the  U.S. to  have  examples  of that);  a sloppy  monitoring  of technical
standards  could  thwart  an export  drive.
Structures
Beyond  the  sale  and  liquidation  of state  enterprises  and  the
elimination  of other  public  sector  activities,  the  reorientation  of  public
sector  functions  discussed  in  the  previous  section  requires  considerable
changes  not  only in  the  actual  organizational  structure  of the  public  sector,
but also  in the  way the  new functions  ought  to  be managed. In other  words,  a
"restructuring"  of the  public  sector  is  necessary. At the  level  of the
organizational  structure,  a  number  of agencies  whose  primary  purpose  is  direct
control  of economic  activities  (e.g.,  industrial  licensing,  foreign  exchange
and import  controls,  price  controls)  will  need  to  be eliminated  or scaled
down.  However,  new  agencies  or units  within  agencies  will  have  to  be created;
for  example,  regulatory  agencies  (e.g.,  for  the  privatized  financial,  sector,- 26 -
capital  markets,  technical  standards)  and  agencies  or  units  capable  of
undertaking  policy  analysis  and  management.  Depending  on the  circumstances  of
each  country,  one  can  conceive  of some  regulations  coming  from  the  private
sector  itself. For  example,  the  accounting  and  auditing  professions,  or the
legal  and  medical  professions  may  have sufficiently  strong  internal  standards
so that  the  role  of the  state  in  their  regulation  could  be  minimal.
These  changes  (not  counting  privatization)  need  not  be massive
relative  to the  total  size  of the  public  sector,  but  are  crucial  because  they
refer  to the  nerve  or command  center  of the  economy. Perhaps  the  best  way to
illustrate  this  point  is to  visualize  those  Latin  American  government  agencies
in charge  of industrial  licensing  and  pricing  or foreign  exchange  controls,
and  what is  expected  to  be.a  modern  regulatory  agency  for  the  industrial
sector. The former  are  traditional  large  agencies  in  which  a  high  proportion
of the  staff  is  composed  of relatively  unskilled  clerks  slowly  processing
applications.  The  agency  is supposedly  managed  and  organized  along
traditional  Weberian  lines  but, in  practice,  is  open  to  heavy  political
control  and  in  many  countries  is  probably  highly  corrupt. In contrast,  a
regulatory  agency  operating  along  the  lines  described  here  ought  to  be a
fairly  small  operation,  staffed  mainly  with  a few  high  quality professionals
doing  economic  and  technical  analysis,  and  a team  of highly  specialized  staff
in charge  of  operating  a data  base.  The  old  controlling  agency  is a
classical,  heavy  bureaucracy;  the  new  regulatory  agency  is  closer  to  a think
tank  and  should  be managed  as such.  It does  not  sound  good  politically,  but
these  new  agencies  should  be elite  units,  to  ensure  the  success  of a  private- 27  -
sector-oriented  strategy. It  behooves  the  political  establishment,  and  the
private  sector  in  particular,  to fully  understand  the  importance  of these  new
agencies  and  the  delicate  role  that  they  are  expected  to play.
Procedures
As can  be concluded  from  the  previous  sections,  the  reorientation
under  discussion  should  imply  not  only  different  functions  and  structures,  but
also  different  procedures.  There  are  many  worth  discussing,  but  we wish to
concentrate  on two.  The  first  and  most  difficult  to  modify  stems  from  the
fact,  already  raised, that  the  public  sector  cum  planning  orientation  of  past
development  strategies  created,  sometimes  unwillingly,  a  heavy  top  down
approach,  in  which  government  officials  decided  on  policies  and  actions
without  really  consulting  the  expected  beneficiaries,  or victims. This  top
down  orientation  resulted  in an increasing  distance  between  the  public  sector
and  the  public  in  general,  including  the  private  sector. The  new strategies
just  cannot  be successful  with  such  an approach. The  dialogue  between  the
public  and  private  sectors,  the  "voice"  of the  stakeholders  affected  by the
government  policies  and  actions  and  the  possibility  of a  bottom-up  generation
of those  policies  are  indispensable  ingredients.  It is  expected  to  be much
more  of a partnership  and should  function  as such.
Many  of the  specific  mechanisms  for  this  more  open  approach  are
culture-bound,  and  the  process  is  undoubtedly  helped  by a democratic  political
setting,  but  several  measures  could  be  borrowed  from  the  experience  of- 28 -
developed  countries. For  example, some  countries  have  evolved  procedures
that  permit  prior  comment  on regulations  or even  policy  changes  by affected
individuals  or groups,  making  sure  that  this  voice  does  not  reflect  only
powerful  vested  interests. Other  procedures  have  been  designed  to assure
transparency  in the  design  process  of  policies  and  regulations,  to  minimize
the  risk  of collusion  and  corruption,  to inform  the  public  about  decisions  in
language  ordinary  people  can  understand  and,  a crucial  element,  that  permit
the  appeal  by interested  parties. The  essence  of the  argument  in  this  respect
is that  individuals  and  private  enterprises  are  willing  to take  risks  in  part
becau-e  they  have  a reasonable  assurance  that  the  state  will  act in  a
predictable,  open  and  systematic  fashion,  treat  them  fairly,  give  them  a voice
and inform  them  of results. The  less  the  private  units  are  assured  of  this
behavior,  the  higher  the  premium  they  will  require  to invest  and  operate  and,
as a consequence,  the  more  difficult  it  will  be for  a  particular  country  to
promote  a private  sector-based  strategy.
The  second  point  is  closely  related. For the  private  sector  to
function,  the  points  of contact  between  public  sector  agencies  and  individuals
and  private  sector  operators  have  to  be much  more  efficient  than  what they  are
now  and  need  to  be greatly  streamlined.  By this  we mean,  for  example,  the
whole  system  of tax  collection,  cf technical  licensing  and  control,  the
issuance  of exports  or import  permits  (when  still  required),  credit
processing,  etc. 16 This  issue  is  so important  that  the  failure  of the  public
16  Taking  a  broader  perspective,  some  would  add  the  provision  of
infrastructure  services  to this  list.- 29  -
sector  to  operate  efficiently  in these  areas  is  given  as  much  weight  in
explaining  the  existence  of the  informal  sector  as of distorted  policies  and
cumbersome  regulations.  Perhaps  many  private  sector  units  might  have  been
able  to live  with  unsatisfactory  policies  and  regulations;  what  makes  them
practically  impossible  to  live  with is  the  appalling  way in  which  they  are
applied.
Much can  be done in  this  respect. It is  a potential  area  of
improvement  which  is  highly  technical,  specific  a.ad  which  could  show
impressive  results  in a relatively  short  period  of  time.  It is a  way  to focus
administrative  reform  on the  specific  points  of contact  between  the  public
sector--the  bureaucracy--and  the  publics  rather  than  on  broad  administrative
reforms. There  is  positive  experience  on this  in  Latin  America. For  example,
the  de-bureaucratization  program  in  Brazil  has  had  an important  measure  of
lasting  success  and  other  countries  have followed  that  experience,  albeit  only
partially. 17
17  See  Helio  Beltrao,  "Debureacratization  and  Freedom",  Brazil  National
Debureacratization  Program,  April  1982;  processed.- 30 -
Skills  and  Incentives
What these  new  functions,  structures  and  procedures  require  are  a
different  kind  of civil  servant  and  a  changed  set  of incentives.  The typical
kind  of staff  that  will  become  redundant  is  the  middle  level,  clerical  one
that  was involved  in routine  controlling  and  licensing  functions. The  kind
that  will  become  essential  is the  high  level  professional  capable  of working
on policy  analysis  and  design,  on  monitoring,  on regulatory  actions  and  on
effective  support  to  private  sector  activities.  Many  of this  staff  should
have  sufficient  professional  stature  and  integrity  not  only  to  dialogue  with
the  private  sector  but  also  to  withstand  its  financial  and  non-financial
pressures. And,  crucially,  they  should  be able  to  dialogue  with  politicians.
As indicated,  this  kind  of staff  is  actually  available  in  most  Latin  American
countries,  but often  is  not  attracted  or retained  by the  public  sector. A
different  kind  of  pay and  incentives  system  is required,  sufficient  to  lure
the  right  individuals  to these  key  assignments.  Some  countries  (e.g.,  Mexico,
Brazil,  Chile,  Argentina)  could  achieve  this  objective  with  relative  ease;
some  of these  countries  already  have  a sizeable  proportion  of the  staff
needed. What is required  is  perhaps  a different  set  of incentives  and  a  work
atmosphere  more conducive  to  the  performance  of the  new  functions.
Other  countries  have  relatively  less "stock"  of the  type  of  skills
required  and  very few  of these  are  in the  public  sector,  to  a large  extent
because  of an inadequate  system  of remuneration  and  incentives.  An
unfavorable  political  climate  leads  highly  skilled  professionals  to doubt  the- 31 -
possibility  of effectiveness  in  public  sector  assignments.  The  dilemma  is  how
to  attract  them in  the  context  of the  unfavorable  civil  service  policies
prevailing  in  those  countries. As indicated  earlier,  we think  that  these
countries  ought  to  take  all  the  measures  that  are  necessary  to  ensure  a
minimum  level  of the  relevant  staffing,  even  if it  means  working  on an
exception  or enclave  basis.
IV.  The  Ouality  of Politics
En  discussions  about  the  changed  role  of the  state  and  the  new
development  strategies,  there  is  a topic  about  which  little  has  been said.
This,  for  want  of a  better  name,  we might  call  the  quality,  or effectiveness
of the  political  process. And  yet, I  would  assert  that  practically  no country
has  been able  to develop  in  a sustained  way  without  a  political  system  that
functions  with a  minimum  level  of effectiveness  and  ethical  standards,  that
is,  with a  minimum  level  of quality  and  stability. Some  countries  might  have
managed  to  have spurts  of  growth  over  fairly  prolonged  periods  of time,  but if
the  political  establishment  has  not  been  able  to  modernize  and  adapt  to  that
growth,  the  initial  impulse  will  be lost  because  of  political  inefficiency.
If those  minimum  conditions  in the  political  process  are  not in  place,  no
strategy  is likely  to  produce  sustained  development.
What do  we mean  by the  quality  of  politics? The  first  ingredient  is
a  more "effective"  political  process. Nobody  has  defined  exactly  what this
entails,  but it surely  includes  elements  such  as a long-term  perspective  in- 32 -
policy design instead of a concentration  on immediate gains; a minimum level
of stability in the policy framework; a low level of corruption so that actual
behavior is guided by policies and regulations and not by payoffs (thus  making
general behavior predictable); a general sense that political control does not
necessarily imply public ownership or operation.  These, I think, are widely
accepted points in principle, but not in practice.  But other aspects are
equally or perhaps more important in the Latin American context.  Politicians
intervene excessively in the operations of the public and private sectors to
the point where they often end up acting against their own political
interests.  This is because politicians act following a partial or short-term
perspective.  For example, price controls for public enterprises aimed at
reducing  inflation  which result in higher inflation through the increased
budget deficit (a  higher inflation could end up hurting even more important
constituents than those originally favored  by price controls); political
appointments of incompetent staff that bankrupt agencies that were the
politicians' power centers; funding channeled to preferred regions that end up
distorting resource allocation and damaging even the favored areas.  Another
way of making the same point is that there  might be more effective ways to
meet the (public and private) goals of politicians at lower cost to society
and with higher benefits to the  politicians themselves.
Equally important, the political establishment has to understand
that to saddle agencies, central institutions  or public enterprises,  with an
excessive number of often contradictory economic, political and social
objectives makes their effective management practically impossible.  To manage- 33 -
an activity with one clear objective is difficult enough.  As the number of
objectives increases, the potential for management failure increases
exponentially.  Over the last decades, politicians became used to and
convinced of the legitimacy of intervening in all sorts of economic activities
to correct market failures and to promote political, social or other
objectives.  There is a fairly elaborate theoretical  basis in economics and in
politics to justify those interventions.1 8 But the massive bureaucratic
failures in Latin America, exacerbated in the last decade by the economic
crisis, have shown the impossibility of continuing with that degree of
political intervention in the workings of the economic system.  The fact is
that such levels of attempted correction of the economic and political system
are, literally,  unmanageable.  The result often has been stagnation  or evcn
decline, states in which none of the objectives--economic, social or
political--are ever achieved.  Everybody loses, including the politicians.  A
central ingredient of the new development strategies should be a more
effective use of political power, based on a clear notion that the number of
objectives that can be pursued simultaneously is small and that individual
entities can be saddled with only a few of them.  To have a sporting chance of
being successful, political agendas have to be modest and objectives pursued
preferably one by one.
A corollary to the previous discussion is the need for political and
bureaucratic commitment at all levels of the public sector towards a different
18  For a recent summary of the causes of markec failures, and an attempt
to explain the  bases of non-market failure as well, see Charles  Wolf, Jr.,
Markets of Governments, Cambridge,  Mass.  M.I.T. Press, 1988.- 34 -
role  for  the  state  along  the  lines  discussed  in this  paper. One  could
hypothesize  that  this  kind  of development  strategy  requires  an even  greater
commitment  of state  units  at all  levels,  than  a  public  sector-oriented  one,
because  the  relations  between  the  public  and  private  sectors  will  be more
decentralized  and  more  dependent  on the  decisions  of  a large  number  of
officials. How  to  build  up and  sustain  such  a commitment  is  a  big subject
that  needs  to  be explored.
What could  be done  to improve  the  quality  of politics? Latin
America  should  look  for  specific  approaches  beyond  the  obvious  answers  of
improving  the  democratic  process  and  the  accountability  of the  political
system. Strengthening  the  technocracy  (inside  and  outside  the  government),
particularly  with  regard  to  policy  analysis,  design  and imp.ementation,  could
provide  not  only  the  information  necessary  to improve  the  quality  of  political
decision  making,  but also  act  as a de facto  countervailing  power,  as it
happens  in  many developed  countries.
But  more imaginative  measures  might  be needed  to change  the
entrenched  habits  of Latin  American  politicians.  Why  not training  (although
of course,  it  should  never  be presented  like  that  to the  politicians)?  Many
countries  already  have such  programs,  with  different  levels  of success. There
are  several  possibilities:  seminars  and  conferences  with  universities  and
think  tanks;  exchanges  and  visits  to  countries  with  more  advanced  systems;
seminars  especially  organized  for  parliamentarians;  technical  staff  attached- 35 -
to individual  politicians  or groups  of  politicians.  The  problem  is  serious;
the  search  for  solutions  is  just  beginning.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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